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MITSUBISHI MOTORS CORP. Cert to CAl {Campbell, Coffin, 
Bownes) 
v. 
SOLER CHRYSLER-PLYMOUTH Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: 
~ 
Petr challenges a holding that, notwithstanding agree-
ment by parties to submit all disputes arising out of their contract 
to arbitration, an alleged antitrust violatior~ arising out of the in-
te ~ tract is nonarbitrable. 
FACTS: Petr, of course, is a well-known Japanese corporation and ~ 
automaker, which manufactures vehicles for sale in certain territories 
outside the United States through Chrysler dealers. Resp is a Puerto 
Rico corporation and formerly a franchised Chrysler dealer. In 1979, . 
( Resp entered into a "distributor agreement" with Chrysler. At the 
same time, it entered into a separate "sales procedure agreement" with 
both Chrysler and Petr. 
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provided in relevant part that all disputes which may arise "shall be 
finally settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules 
and regulations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." Two 
years later, Resp became unable to meet its minimum sales commitments 
in its territory. Resp's inventory grew, its finances worsened, and 
Petr began withholding shipments of new vehicles to Resp. Eventually, 
Petr stored 966 vehicles that otherwise would have been shipped to 
Resp in Puerto Rico. 
In February 1982, Resp disclaimed responsibility for the 966 ve-
hicles stored in Japan. A month later, Petr brought suit against Resp 
in federal district court, raising .a host of claims. On the basis of 
its claims, Petr sought an order compelling arbitration under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the Convention's implementing 
legislation. Resp denied the claims and counterclaimed, alleging, 
inter alia, violation of the Sherman Act. The District Court held 
that all of Petr's claims and all but two of Resp's counterclaims fell 
within the scope of the parties' arbitration agreement. The court 
explicitly held that Resp's counterclaim for violation of the Shermah 
Act came within the terms of the agreement. In express reliance upon 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974), the District Court 
rejected Resp's argument that an antitrust claim could not, as a mat-
ter of law, be referred to arbitration, dismissed the Sherman Act 
claim, and referred it to arbitration. It found, "based on the rea-
soning of the Court in Scherk refusing to extend Wilke [ v. Swan, 346 
U.S. ,427 (1953)) to international securities transactions," that the 
I Second Circuit's decision in American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. 
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (CA2 1968), should not govern antitrust 





HOLDING BELOW: The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's holding that each of the claims and counterclaims that had 
been referred by the District Court to arbitration, including the 
Sherman Act claim, were within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 
Notwithstanding its finding that the antitrust claim fell within the 
terms of the arbitration agreement, however, the Court of Appeals held 
that litigation was the proper means for resolution of the Sherman Act 
claim. As is true of antitrust claims arising out of domestic con-
tracts, American Safety, supra, said the court, antitrust claims in an 
international context should not be submitted to arbitration. (Be-
cause the question was one of first impression, the court had request-
ed the views of the Department of Justice and the State Department on 
this issue. Both had urged that the court apply to international con-
tracts the same exception that has for years been applied to domestic / 
contracts.) 
The court noted that courts are unanimous that Sherman Act claims 
arising out of domestic contracts should not be submitted to arbitra-
tion. Such a policy is dictated by numerous policy concerns. Among 
others, the complexity of antitrust issues renders them ill-suited for 
arbitration. Second, the antitrust laws are thought so important to 
the functioning of a free economy that the combined efforts of govern-
ment and the private parties are needed to enforce them. And third, 
enforcement of the antitrust laws is thought too important to be 
lodged in arbitrators from the business community who have a vested 
interest in the application of those laws. 
The court saw no reason why these same policy concerns do not 
apply in the international context. It suggested that other nations 
are not ignorant of "the primacy" we accord our antitrust laws, and it 
observed that the Republic of Germany also prohibits enforcement of 
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~s its antitrust laws through arbitration. The court said that it doubt-
ed that other countries would describe the interest of the United 
States in the enforcement of its antitrust laws as "'parochial' in the 
sense of being petty provincialisms." 
It then considered whether there are any policy reasons support-
ing application of the rule against arbitration of antitrust claims. 
In this regard, the court said that the "insulation of agreements with 
some international coloration from the antitrust exception would go 
far to limit it to the most minor and significant of business deal-
ings." It reasoned further that "suppliers and sellers could achieve 
immunity from antitrust law threats and sanctions by the simple expe-
dient of co-opting some foreign or international entity into the ar-
rangement." Against this background, the Court of Appeals concluded 
I that the doctrine of nonarbitrability of antitrust issues applies "at 
least [to] the kind of international agreement we confront in this 
case--an agreement governing the sales and distribution of vehicles in 
the United States." Pet., at A-18 (emphasis in original). 
' =--
The court then turned to the question whether the Convention on 
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards prevented a 
holding that antitrust claims are nonarbitrable. On this score, it 
concluded that an agreement to arbitrate is not "an agreement within 
the meaning of" Article II(3) of the Convention because such an agree-
ment does not concern "a subject matter capable of settlement by arbi-
tration," as required by Article II(l), presumably because the policy 
of this country does not permit the submission of such an issue to 
arbitration. 
this 
Finally, the court adefessed the question of the applicability of 
Court's decision in Ycherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 
(1974). It acknowledged that Scherk "poses a considerable roadblock" 
i 
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to excepting antitrust from the general rule of arbitrability "if its 
holding is extrapolated to fit a situation of demonstrably greater 
impact on the United States and a public policy of incommensurably 
greater depth." It nonetheless distinguished Scherk, largely on the 
different policies at issue in the respective cases. The securities ---
laws at issue in Scherk were enacted to protect a relatively small 
~
group of investors; the antitrust laws, on the other hand, were de-
signed to protect the general public by preserving a competitive atmo-
sphere nationwide. Balancing the private party's interest in having 
antitrust claims arbitrated against the public interest "in the pres-
ervation of economic order in the United States," the court found that 
the latter prevailed. 
The court thought it important as well that parties "could not be 
blind to the obvious fact that American law would normally apply to 
any claim of monopolization or restraint of trade," and that antitrust 
is not a "parochial" consideration of the kind referred to in Scherk. 
The court also noted that the Court in Scherk did not rely upon the 
Convention for its holding; the Convention provisions were said only 
to "confirm" the decision required under the Federal Arbitration Act ! 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Petr contends that the decision below, refusing 
to require an antitrust claim to be arbitrated, is "at odds" with the 
Federal Arbitration Act, which provides that an arbitration agreement 
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract," and 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, __ U.S. __ (1984), which recited the 
above, language from the Federal Arbitration Act as one of only two 
1 exceptions to the enforceability of arbitration agreements. If per-
mitted to stand, the decision will disrupt the certainty intended by 
the Federal Arbitration Act. Moreover, courts should not be allowed 
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to engage in the kind of ad hoc decisions on whether a particular 
statutory claim is sufficiently important to defeat congressional pol-
icy as expressed in the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court should 
make it clear that it is for Congress to strike the balance in deter-
mining which, if any, claims should be exempt from arbitration. When 
Congress has wanted to exempt certain classes of litigants or catego-
ries of claims from arbitration, it has done so explicitly. 
(2) Petr next contends that, to the extent the Court of Appeals 
held that an antitrust dispute is not "capable of settlement by arbi-
tration," it refused to enforce a treaty of the United States. If 
"capable of settlement by arbitration" were to have the meaning that 
the Court of Appeals said, the Convention would be but an invitation 
to courts to impose their own notions of wise policy respecting arbi-
tration. An agreement to submit to arbitration a securities dispute 
arising out of international commerce must be enforced, Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., supra. Since nothing in Scherk limits its holding 
to securities actions, the same must be true of antitrust actions 
arising from international transactions. The lower court's conclusion 
that the policies underlying the antitrust laws are greater in signif-
icance than those of the securities laws, thus requiring a different 
result, is without foundation. 
Resp points out that the Second Circuit's decision not to force 
arbitration of antitrust disputes arising out of domestic disputes has 
been followed by every court to consider the issue. It then notes 
that this Court has long recognized that, for public policy reasons, 
cert&in claims {Title VII & Securities Act) should not be referred to 
( arbitration. Citing to United States v. Topco Associates Inc., 405 
U.S. 596, 610 (1972), Resp says the public's interest in judicial res-
olution of antitrust claims at least "stands on equal footing" with 
( 
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7pb LtPi l 
the public's interest in judicial enforcement of ese statutory 
claims. 
This case is distinguishable from Scherk p incipally for the rea-
son cited by the Court of Appeals--the strength of the public interest 
in judicial enforcement of the antitrust laws, a opposed to the secu-
rities laws. Moreover, as the Scherk Court went to pains to empha-
size, the dispute there had only a tangential re ationship to the 
United States. Here, in contrast, the relations ip to the United 
States is direct and substantial; Petr 
to the American marketplace, it has restricted 
question solely to that market. 
Finally, the Court of Appeals did not 
of the United States. Article V(2) of the 
enforcement of an arbitral award 
ly expanded its sales 
e sale of vehicles in 
treaty 
provides that 
where the subject mat-
country, or where the enforcement o the award would be contrary to 
tions where a country would to enforce arbitration. This is 
such an appropriate situ ion, as Germany has determined with respec~ 
refuse to enforce a treaty of the United States; the court simply held 
that antitrust claims, to the extent that they are nonarbitrable under 
the laws in the majority of the circuits, are not "capable of settle-
ment by arbitration" within the meaning of the exception expressly 
provi~ed for by the Convention. y s is no more than an interpreta-
( tion of the treaty's exception. Southland Corp. v. Keating does not 
in any way bar the result reached by the Court of Appeals. Petr's 
various contentions, thus, in effect reduce to claims that the deci-
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sion below declining to submit to arbitration an antitrust claim con-
cededly within the terms of the agreement between the parties con-
flicts with the Federal Arbitration Act, this Court's decision in ? 
J 
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., and the Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. These claims are substan-
tial, even if they would not ultimately prevail. 
! @ Alberto-Culver had decided to expand its overseas op-
erations. Alberto-Culver contracted with Scherk, who owned businesses 
engaged in the manufacture of toiletries and the licensing of trade-
marks for toiletries, for the transfer to Alberto-Culver of Scherk's 
businesses and the rights held by the businesses to trademarks in cos-
metic goods. The contract embodied warranties by Scherk guaranteeing 
unencumbered ownership of the trademarks. The contract also contained 
an arbitration clause providing that "any controversy or claim [that] 
shall arise out of this agreement or the breach thereof" would be re-
ferred to arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce in 
Paris, France, and that the laws of Illinois would govern resolution 
of the dispute. Alberto-Culver subsequently discovered that the 
trademarks were subject to substantial encumbrances. When Scherk re-
fused Alberto-Culver's tender of the trademarks and attempt to rescind 
the contract, Alberto-Culver brought suit in federal district court, 
contending that Scherk's fraudulent representations on the status of 
the trademarks violated §lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule lOb-5. The District Court enjoined Scherk from proceeding to 
~:~ation, pursuant to the contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. 
S~ ~hi { Court, 5-4, reversed, rejecting Alberto-Culver's contentions 
that the Securities Exchange Act claim was nonarbitrable under the 
Court's decision in Wilko v. Swan, ~ ko, the Court held 
that a claim under §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 did not have 
( 
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to be submitted to arbitration, notwithstanding an agreement purport-
ing to require submission of all claims to arbitration, principally 
because §14 of the Act prohibited a party from waiving its right to a 
judicial forum.) Alberto-Culver's contention that Wilko controlled, 
said the Court, ignored the "significant" and "crucial differences" 
between the agreement in Wilko and that in Scherk. 417 U.S., at 515. 
The Alberto-Culver/Scherk agreement, it noted, was "a truly interna-
tional agreement." Ibid. Alberto-Culver was an American company do-
ing the bulk of its activity here; Scherk was a citizen of Germany and 
his businesses were organized under the laws of Germany and Liechten-
stein. The negotiations leading to the contract took place in several 
different countries, and the subject matter of the contract concerned 
the sale of businesses in Europe, whose activities were largely, if 
not entirely, confined to Europe. "Such a contract," said the Court, 
"involves considerations and policies significantly different from 
those found controlling in Wilko." Ibid. --
After observing that, absent an arbitration provision, consider-
able uncertainty existed at the time of the agreement as to the law 
applicable to disputes between the parties, the Court went on to say · 
that 
[s]uch uncertainty will almost inevitably exist 
with respect to any contract touching two or more 
countries, each with its own substantive laws and 
conflict-of-laws rules. A contractual provision spec-
ifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be 
litigated and the law to be applied is, therefore, an 
almost indispensable precondition to achievement of 
the orderliness and predictability essential to any 
international business transaction. Furthermore, such 
a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under 
the agreement might be submitted to a forum hostile to 
the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with 
the problem area involved. 
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country 
to enforce an international arbitration agreement 
would not only frustrate these purposes, but would 
invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by 




Id., at 516-517. v 
After a brief discussion of The Bremen v. Zapato Off-Shore Co., 
407 U.S. 1 (1972), where it was held that a forum-selection clause 
~ 
must be respected in United States courts, the Scherk Court emphasized 
that 
[a]n agreement to arbitrate before a specified 
tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-
selection clause that posits not only the situs of 
suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving 
the dispute. The invalidation of such an agreement in 
the case before us would not only allow the respondent 
to repudiate its solemn promise but would, as well, 
reflect a "parochial concept that all disputes must be 
resolved under our laws and in our courts •.•• We can-
not have trade and commerce in world markets and in-
ternational waters exclusively on our terms, governed 
by our laws, and resolved in our courts. 
Id., at 519 (footnotes omitted; quoting Zapato, supra, at 9). 
The Court did not find it necessary to rest its decision on the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards. It did note, however, that its decision was "confirmed" by 
legislation implementing the Convention, specifically 9 u.s.c. §201, 
which provides that the Convention "shall be enforced in United States 
courts •••• " Id., at 520 n. 15. 
While the composition of the Court has changed somewhat since 
Scherk was decided, I think it likely that at least several members of 
the Court would be of the view tha ~ k controls thi ~ :)and 
that, consequently, arbitration should have been ordered. In this 
case, as in Scherk, Petr and Resp were parties to "a truly interna-
tional agreement." No less uncertainty would exist here than in 
Scherk were the Court to permit the lower courts to refuse to enforce 
. 
arbitration of antitrust claims. No less so here is a contract provi-
sion specifying the forum and the law to be applied "an almost indis-
pensable precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predict-




same danger exists with respect to antitrust suits that a dispute will 
be submitted to a forum "hostile" to the interests of one party, 
either in the absence of an arbitration agreement or given a refusal 
to enforce an arbitration agreement, that was a source of concern in 
Scherk. Refusal to honor an arbitration agreement in the face of an 
antitrust claim evidences the same "parochial" view that all disputes 
must be resolved under our laws that in large part underlay the deci-
sion in Scherk. Finally, there is no more reason that an antitrust 
claims should be exempt from arbitration insofar as the terms of the 
Arbitration Act are concerned, than there is for an exemption for se-
curities law violations. 
In sum, I think Petr is correct that there is a substantial claim 
that the decision below conflicts with the Arbitration Act, providing 
that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevocable, and en-
forceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract," and a decision of this Court--Scherk--
interpreting that Act. The Court in Scherk did intimate that a situa-
tion might arise where the contacts with the foreign country were "so 
insignificant or attenuated" that the rule of Wilke might apply. 4li 
U.S., at 517 n. 11. However, it is doubtful that this is that case, 
given that Petr is a Japanese Corporation, with its principal place of 
business in Japan, and that the vehicles in question were manufactured 
in Japan and stored in Japan when Resp became insolvent. Additional-
ly, the underlying conduct of the alleged antitrust violation is con-
duct that occurred in Japan. It may also be, as the Court of Appeals 
held ~nd Resp suggests, that there are persuasive policy distinctions 
between the securities laws at issue in Scherk and the antitrust laws 
here that might counsel a policy of refusal to submit antitrust claims 
to international arbitration. Moreover, an argument can be made that 
l 
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because Petr ships its vehicles into the domestic market, it should 
expect to have its antitrust claims resolved in American courts. But, 
while one can assert that there need not be an express congressional 
exemption for antitrust claims if the courts have so held and Congress 
has acquiesced, I do not read Scherk or the Arbitration Act to allow 
the courts to make this kind of policy assessment; as Petr contends, 
such a decision would appear to be one for Congress alone. 
Were the Court to reverse on the Arbitration Act issue, presum-
ably a remand would cause the Court of Appeals to reassess its holding 
on the Convention; that holding rested squarely on the ground that 
antitrust claims are not arbitrable under the laws of the United 
States. If the Court is not interested in the principal issue, I can-
not say that the Convention issue alone is worthy of review here. 
There are any number of options. First, every court of appeal to 
address the arbitrability of antitrust claims in the context of a do-
mestic agreement has held that they are nonarbitrable, but to the ex-
tent that this case involves an international agreement, it is one of 
first impression. One could await a conflict. The Court of Appeals 
holding was limited to agreements relating to "sales and distributiori 
of vehicles in the United States." There was apparently no conflict 
in Scherk, however; the Court took the case solely because of the "im-
portance of the question presented." 417 U.S., at 510. This issue 
would seem no less important, particularly if the Court continues to 
have an interest in the international arbitration process. 
Second, the Court could call for the views of the Solicitor Gen-
eral., Given that the Court has once recognized the importance of the 
( general issue in Scherk, arguably this may be unnecessary in terms of 
the decision whether or not to take the case. As noted, both the De-
partment of Justice--which may or may not have involved the Solicitor-
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-and the State Department, expressed their views to the Court of Ap-
peals that such claims should be nonarbitrable. If the Court does not 
now CVSG, he can come in as amicus if the case is taken. Third, the 
Court could simply grant the case. 
I lean slightly toward recommending a grant. However, I am un-
certain enough about the potential disruptive effect internationally 
of the holding below that I recommend that the Court CVSG. The case 
clearly has national and international ramifications. The question is 
the nature of its effect. If the SG says the ramifications are sig-
nificant, the Court can grant the case. If, on the other hand, he 
believes, for whatever reasons, that the international disruption is 
negligible, the Court might well choose to await further developments. 
I recommend CVSG. 
There is a response. 
May 2, 1984 Luttig Ops in petn 
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SUMMARY: Cross-Petr challenges the holding below requiring it to 
submit to arbitration one of its counterclaims under the Dealers' Day 
in Court Act. Additionally, it presents a question as to whether the 
opinion below intended to require arbitration of its antitrust claim 
under . the Puerto Rican antitrust statute. 
FACTS: This is~ ro~ o.~ , which was re-
scheduled from the M~v 10 Conference so----!-t- could be considered with 




this cross-petition. The recommendation in 83-1569 is to CVSG. I 
> 
refer you to the earlier memorandum for a cdrnplete- recitation of the 
facts. Essentially, Cross-Petr and Cross-Resp entered into a "sales 
procedure agreement" pursuant to which all disputes would be "finally 
settled by arbitration in Japan in accordance with the rules and regu-
lations of the Japan Commercial Arbitration Association." Cross-Petr 
became unable to meet its minimum sales committments in its territory, 
and Cross-Resp began to withhold vehicles that otherwise would have 
been shipped to Cross-Petr in Puerto Rico. Cross-Petr disclaimed re-
sponsibility for the vehicles that were stored on its behalf, and 
Cross-Resp brought suit in federal district court, seeking an order 
compelling arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. Cross-Petr 
counterclaimed, alleging, inter alia, violation of the Sherman Act, 
the federal Dealers' Day in Court Act, and Puerto Rico's antitrust 
act. The District Court held that all of Cross-Resp's claims and all 
but two of Cross-Petr's counterclaims fell within the scope of the 
parties' arbitration agreement, and it referred all these claims to 
arbitration. The court explicitly held that Cross-Petr's counterclaim,. 
for violation of the Sherman Act came within the terms of the agree-
ment. 
HOLDING BELOW: The Court of Appeals affirmed the District 
Court's holding that each of the claims and counterclaims that that 
court referred to arbitration, including the Sherman Act claim, were 
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. With the exception of 
Cross-Petr's Sherman Act claim, and possibly its antitrust claim based 
on tne Puerto Rico statute, the court also affirmed the District 
Court's order directing that all claims and counterclaims, including 
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Cross-Petr's counterclaims under the Dealer's Day in Court Act, 15 
u.s.c. §1221 et seq. be submitted to an arbitrator. The Court of Ap-
peals declined for policy reasons to refer Cross-Petr's Sherman Act 
claim to arbitration. (This validity of this refusal is challenged in 
the petition.) There is some confusion over whether Cross-Petr's 
antitrust claim under the Puerto Rico statute has been referred to 
arbitration. In this regard, the Court of Appeals simply reversed the 
District Court's order "submitting [Cross-Petr's] Anti-Trust claims" 
to arbitration. Cross-Resp, however, has taken the position that this 
claim must be submitted to arbitration. 
CONTENTIONS: (1) Cross-Petr contends that the Court of Appeals 
erred in referring to arbitration its counterclaim under the Dealers' 
Day in Court Act because Cross-Petr had not expressly agreed to arbi-
trate statutory claims. In holding that this claim must be submitted 
to arbitration because the factual allegations underlying the claim 
"touched" upon arbitrable provisions of the Sales Procedure Agreement, 
says Cross-Petr, the court adopted a standard in conflict with that of 
the Ninth Circuit in Leya v. Certified Grocers of California, Ltd., 
593 F.2d 857, cert. denied. 444 u.s. 827 (1979). Before a party can 
be compelled to arbitrate a statutory claim, there must be some "posi-
tive assurance" that the party agreed to do so. The Court of Appeals 
simply misunderstood the scope of the parties' arbitration clause; 
they did not intend to arbitrate all disputes, but only selected ones. 
(2) Cross-Petr also contends that Cross-Resp is mistaken in asserting 
that the Court of Appeals intended to reverse the District Court's 
order of arbitration only to the extent that it included the Sherman 
Act claim, not Cross-Petr's antitrust claim under Puerto Rican law. 
- 4 -
The court could not have intended to send the state statutory issue to 
arbitration, while holding that the Sherman Act claim could not be 
arbitrated. 
(1) Cross-Resp says that Cross-Petr simply wants to have this 
Court narrowly construe a particular arbitration clause that by its 
terms is very broad, requiring the submission to arbitration of "all 
disputes, controversies or differences which may arise ••• out of or 
in relation to ••• " the relevant provisions of the agreement. It is 
well-settled that an arbitration clause need not refer to a particular 
statute to encompass claims under that statute. The claim is not 
certworthy in any event. (2) Cross-Resp says that the contention that 
the Court of Appeals did not intend to send the Puerto Rico antitrust 
claim to arbitration is not worthy of the Court's attention. Cross-
Resp's remedy is to file a motion for clarification in the Court of 
Appeals. At any rate, it is clear that the Court of Appeals did not 
intend what Cross-Resp suggests it did. As the opinion states, "(t]he 
principal issue on this appeal is whether arbitration of federal anti-
trust claims may be compelled." There is no hint of nonarbitrability 
of the antitrust claim under the Puerto Rico statute. 
DISCUSSION: There is nothing certworthy here. The only issue of 
real consequence in this case apparently is whether the Sherman Act 
claim is exempt from arbitration (83-1569). (1) Cross-Petr's first 
claim amounts to little more than a disagreement with the lower 
court's construction of the scope of the arbitration agreement. There 
is no conflict with the Ninth Circuit's decision. (2) As Cross-Resp 
notes, the second claim raises only an issue of the meaning of the . 
Court of Appeals' opinion, i.e. whether, by referring to Cross-Petr's 
•, 
I 
"Anti-Trust claims," the court intended to affirm the District Court's 
order directing that the Dealers' Day in Court Act claim be arbitrated 
or to reverse that decision. It is essentially a factual question as 
to the scope of the opinion of the court below. This is a matter 
properly addressed to that court in the first instance. 
I recommend denial. 
There is a response. 
May 23, 1984 Luttig Ops in petn 
May 31, 1984 
Court ................... . ·voted on .................. , 19 .. . 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: Annmarie 
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Soler Chrysler-Plymouth v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
Background 
CAl held that, notwithstanding the parties' agreement 
to submit all disputes arbitration, an alleged antitrust 
violation arising out of their international contract is 
nonarbitrable. Petr claims that this decision is "at odds" 
with the Federal Aribtration Act and this Court's decision 
in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974). 
Cross-petr challenges CAl's holding that it must submit to 
arbitration one of its countercliams under the Dealers' Day 
in Court Act. The Court called for the views of the SG. 
SG's Views 
The SG recommends that cert be denied in both cases. 
The SG believes that CAl's holding that Soler's antitrust 
claim is nonarbitrable is correct and notes that five other 1 _____ __ 
courts of appeals have reached the same decision. The SG 
also rejects as unpersuasive petr's claim that in holding 
2. 
the antitrust claim to be nonarbitrable, CAl failed to en-
force the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards. The Convention is limited by its 
terms to matters capable of settlement by arbitration, and 
there is little doubt that antitrust falls into the limited 
class of such subjects. 
v" 
Finally, contrary to petr, the SG argues that CAl's 
decision did not conflict with Scherck. In Scherck, the 
Court held that the arbitration clause in a "truly interna-
tional contract" was enforceable in the context of a claim -----for damages for violations of §lO(b) of the Securities Ex-
change Act. The Court reasoned that (1) the arbitration 
provision solved an "especially vexatious" problem, the 
choice of law for an international contract dispute: (2) a 
parochial refusal by one country's courts to grant arbitra-
tion would "invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockey-
ing by the parties to secure tactical litigation 
advantages:" (3) any advantage a domestic plaintiff might 
win by virtue of a ruling against arbitration may well be 
"chimercal", since the foreign defendant might obtain a for-
eign court order nullifying such advantage. 
The SG argues that the antitrust laws represent fun-
damental policies of the United States and not the kind of 
"parochial" interest the Court wanted to avoid in Scherck. 
The Convention on arbitration recognizes exceptions to arbi-
tration agreements for just such fundamental principles, and 
thus Scherck should not be deemed controlling here. 
With respect to the c SG be-
lieves that they are factbound and not certworthy. 
Discussion 
I am persuaded that the SG, like CAl, is right on the 
--. 
merits of this case. I am not entirely convinced, however, 
that the case isn't certworthy. The question whether 
Scherck applies seems close. Five CAs apparently agree 
- -------·-
that antitrust claims are not subject to arbitration, but ---------------------------------------- -
only one or two of these decisions came after Scherck. A 
grant would give the Court a chance to clarify Scherck's 
applicability, and thus may be useful. 
I recommend that you join three to grant No.1569 (the 
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MEMO TO FILE: 
This brief memo is dictated after a preliminary 
reading of the briefs. Although I am not entirely at 
rest, I am inclined to affirm CAl. 
Soler is a Puerto Rican corporation (in effect a 
u.s. corporation) that entered into a Distributor's 
Agreement (dealership) that gave Soler the right to sell 
vehicles made in Japan actually made by a Japanese 
corporation formed as a joint venture between Chrysler and 
Mitsubishi. 
The dealership agreement provided that it should 
be construed in accordance with the laws of the "Swiss , 
Confederation", and expressly provided for arbitration in 
Japan of contract disputes. 
Following a slump in the new car market, Soler 
was unable to meet its minimum sales commitments in its 
asigned territory. Soler therefore attempted to transship 
automobiles to other areas, including Central and South 
America and the United States. Mitsubishi refused to 
v' 
2. 
permit the transshipment, and withheld shipment to Soler 
of 1,000 vehicles ordered by Soler. 
Mitsubishi brought suit against Soler in the 
U.S. District Court of Puerto Rico seeking an order 
11 . b · t -r. · J f 11 d b h f th compe 1ng ar 1 rar1on 1n apan o a ege reac es o e 
dealership agreement. The District Court ordered 
arbitration, but CAl - in a unanimous opinion,1 reversed 
the District Court oh that issue. On other issues (it is 
not entirely clearly to mef precisely what they are at 
this time}, CAl affirmed the DC. 
The principal issue that prompted grant of 
certiorari, as stated in the amicus brief of the Solicitor 
General (SG}, is: 
"Whether the District Court erred in referring 
the federal antitrust counterclaim in this case 
to foreign arbitration pursuant to the terms of 
the parties' contract". 
I should have said above that Soler, in a cross 
petition filed in the DC, asserted a violation of the U.S. 
antitrust laws by the refusal of Mitsubishi to permit the 




The SG's brief, addressing only the arbitration 
issue, argues strongly and persuasively that foreign 
arbitration of our antitrust laws would be inappropriate. 
As the SG put it, the antitrust laws "embody a policy of 
preserving competition that is of great significance to 
our national interests". The enforcement of antitrust 
laws by private litigation, and treble damages, 
significantly furthers this national interest. 
The SG states that "every court of appeals that 
has considered the question has held that federal 
antitrust claims are not arbitrable". 
Mitsubishi presents a second question whether 
arbitration of anti trust issues is compelled under the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards. I am inclined to think that if the SG is 
correct as to the Sherman Act not being the subject of 
foreign arbitration, I do not think this Convention - that 
is not explicit ~l with respect to antitrust claims -
should cause a different result. 
Mitsubishi relies primarily on this Court's 
decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. Scherk involved 
a controversy between a United States company and a German 





Court's prior holding in Wilko v. Swan, that securities 
~~'3'3~ 
claims are not arbitrable in a domestic dispute, the Court 
I\ 
in Scherk held that different considerations were involved 
where a specific arbitration agreement had been made 
between a foreign national and an American company with 
respect to a securities act question, and that arbitration 
was appropriate. The SG also commented that the treble 
damages provision of the antitrust laws is not included in 
the federal securities laws, and that this is another 
distinction. 
I am not entirely satisified that Scherk is as 
easily distinguishable as the SG argues, but on balance I 
am inclined now to agree with him. I will be interested 
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